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Knowledge Transfer as Intercultural Translation in the 
German-Korean Context – Facing Possible Future 
Challenges within the Triangle of Unification, System 
Transformation and Societal Integration 
Everhard Holtmann, Eun-Jeung Lee & Christian Rademacher ∗ 
Abstract: »Wissenstransfer als interkulturelle Übersetzung im deutsch-
koreanischen Kontext – Möglichen künftigen Herausforderungen begegnen im 
Dreieck von Vereinigung, Systemtransformation und sozialer Integration«. It is 
evident that Korea and Germany are embedded in different cultural traditions 
and are part of different scenarios of international politics. Acting on this general 
assumption, a coincidence of national unification and abrupt system change simi-
lar to the German process of transition does not seem likely. At most a policy of 
small steps may be an alternative. This is the reason why South Korean project 
partners are also interested in the antecedent times of two divided German 
states. From a theoretical perspective, the attempt of transferring the knowledge 
of unification to Korea requires a new contextualization of knowledge. This act 
can be understood as a process of transcoding. Having the practical expectations 
of Korean project partners in mind, a set of “manuals” has been worked out for 
seven domains of transfer. Additionally, a simulation game has been created and 
already tested. The written manuals may be useful to promote at least incremen-
tal steps towards a controlled institutional change of a dictatorial regime. 
Keywords: System change, transcoding, domains of policy-transfer, controlled 
institutional change, national unification. 
1.  Comparing Germany and Korea – Specific Dimensions 
of Unification and System Change  
The essays presented in this HSR Forum will serve to provide in a condensed 
form an overview of the results of the transfer project “Knowledge Transfer as 
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Intercultural Translation: Development of Exemplary Practices of Transfor-
mation-preparing Activities in Korea” for selected working fields and prob-
lems.1 The transfer project’s leading questions and results on their part are 
based on theoretical reflections and empirical findings which have been elabo-
rated by the Collaborative Research Center 580 (“Social developments after 
structural change. Discontinuity, tradition, structural formation”) at the univer-
sities of Jena and Halle (Saale). The objective of the transfer project which was 
also co-funded by the German Research Foundation (DFG) was to “transfer 
select explanatory approaches and empirical findings of transformation re-
search which had been compiled for the cases of unified Germany, and Eastern 
and Western Europe from a comparative-expanded perspective, to South Ko-
rea” (Holtmann and Lee 2012, 3). 
All project members acknowledged from the outset that the situation of East 
and West Germany in 1989/90 is vastly different from the current situation on 
the Korean peninsula apart from the environment of national division and de-
pendency on international conflict situations. Korea is not Germany – both 
states and civic societies took diverging historical paths of development a long 
time ago (Lee 2014). Moreover, Germany and Korea are embedded in different 
cultural traditions. The involvement into international power conflicts of both 
the divided partial states of Germany and Korea respectively resulted in con-
trasting developments: While the four powers of the former anti-Hitler coali-
tion gave up their reservations about German reunification, such an agreement 
between the USA and China – North and South Korea’s protective powers – is 
still not in sight (Kydd 2015; Hundt 2010; Kim 2006, 2003). 
Notwithstanding this, German unity keeps the hopes for a future national re-
unification aflame in the Republic of Korea. Since 1990, not only have over 
5000 scientific papers about this topic been published, the issue has also been 
mentioned in parliamentary debates more than a similar number of times while 
simultaneously being an ongoing issue in the media. In this way a public dis-
course about the “lessons” of the German unification has emerged (Lee 2014).  
The knowledge transfer was performed in two directions within the Ger-
man-Korean project network. Firstly, findings and experiences, research ques-
tions and problem definitions regarding the German reunification are trans-
ferred into schemes or rather forms under consideration of the Korean 
expectations, i.e. more practically applicable forms. These forms “can serve as 
                                                             
1  This transfer project was jointly financed by the South Korean Ministry of Unification and 
the German Research Foundation (DFG). It was executed from 2012 until 2015 under the 
leadership of the Zentrum für Sozialforschung Halle (Center for Social Research) and the 
Institute of Korean Studies of the Freie Universität Berlin in close cooperation with col-
leagues of the former collaborative research center 580 from the University Halle and Uni-
versity Jena, as well as numerous Korean experts, politicians and scientists. 
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‘lessons’ for the preparation and support of transformative activities in Korea” 
(Holtmann and Lee 2012, 2). In doing so, the transfer project – and this is an 
explicitly intended side effect – also makes the Korean domestic discourse 
about the German reunification accessible for international transformation 
research. Secondly, the SFB 580 was also able to control its own explanatory 
models in regard to generalizability and transferability from the European into 
the East Asian context, a field that had so far been largely neglected by com-
parative transformation research. 
The special (i.e. the particularly strained) relationship between North and 
South Korea makes a coincidence of national unity and abrupt system change 
similar to the German case seem unrealistic, or at least imponderable. In the 
medium-term, small-scale patterns with intermediate problem-solving goals 
seem to be at best conceivable. These should be sounded out by the way of 
international rapprochement and collaboration, starting from building regional 
or local contacts. This way of a “policy of small steps” was pursued by the 
Brandt/Scheel administration at the end of the 1960s during the so-called Neue 
Ostpolitik (New Eastern Policy). 
This was accompanied by hopes for a “change through rapprochement” on the 
West German side. However, our South Korean cooperating partners are well 
aware of the fact that the détente policy that was introduced at that time despite 
the ongoing East-West conflict created the psychological and material precondi-
tions within the intra- German relations for the – albeit ultimately surprising – 
German reunification. Hence, their primary interest about the “German case” lies 
in the time period that may be understood as the prehistory of German unifica-
tion, i.e. the time interval between the late 1960s and the end of the 1980s. 
The German project partners can contribute insights into the inner societal de-
velopment of the GDR before 1989. These insights consist partly of research 
results of the SFB 580 and to a degree emerged within the transfer project envi-
ronment, the latter thus being the most recent findings. Firstly, the “GDR Repre-
sentative Surveys”2 that had gone largely unnoticed for decades and were recent-
ly been rediscovered for research and the public, document the general mood of 
the East German community at that time. They show clearly that: (1) The desire 
for reunification remained unbroken in East Germany from the 1960s. (2) Alt-
hough the majority of the East German populace had come to terms with the 
prevailing conditions, they (3) saw a better alternative system in the Federal 
Republic of Germany. On the other hand, the East German people knew how to 
adapt to the economy of scarcity, which included a “creative barter economy,” 
                                                             
2  The former Ministry for All-German Affairs carried out annual interviews between 1968 and 
1989 with GDR visitors who returned to the BRD about the attitudes of the East German 
contact persons (relatives, business partners) they visited. The reports were classified at that 
time (Holtmann and Köhler 2015). 
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with personal skill and individual initiative (Holtmann and Köhler 2015). This 
prevailing general mood explains why expectations of the East German populace 
were high at the time of German unification. The initial “unification euphoria” 
however, was quickly followed by a “transformational shock” (ibid.). 
Secondly, memories about the times of the old system in the form of bio-
graphical-formative experiences of the older generations stay alive long after its 
demise (cf. Silbereisen 2016, in this HSR Forum). Multi-generational-interviews 
with East German families conducted during the transfer project3 indicate that 
“system” and “living environment” become delinked in the personal memory. 
Although the oppressive character of the communist system is unquestioned by 
the older generation, in hindsight what really counts are positive memories about 
the private (and partly occupational) everyday life in the GDR. They evidently do 
not want these positive aspects of their personal biography taken away from 
them. This is supposedly a generalizable coping mechanism for system-change 
experiences: The memories of the “good aspects” of life under dictatorship that 
were experienced ‘in the shadow’ of the regime remain. This attitude requires 
however, that the regime permitted sufficient private freedoms. 
Against the backdrop of these considerations, we can draw the following 
conclusions for the transfer of knowledge about unification that is “stored up” in 
the German transformation research and the SFB 580 to the Korean peninsula. 
First, referring to the dimension of range and time of change, it shall be un-
derstood that the transfer project was neither focused on the question whether 
or not a reunification of both Koreas would be realistic in principle, nor at 
which date a reunification might happen. 
Such long-term prognosis would not be useful, especially considering the 
fact that developments are usually predicted more pessimistic than they actual-
ly turn out to be. Instead, the transfer project hypothetically presumes a path of 
rapprochement and democratic transformation that has already been taken. 
Only by leaving open all possible scenarios can the transfer project’s findings 
unfold their full practical applicability. Studying the experiences of the German 
unity process can be useful for coping with an abrupt upheaval scenario as well 
as presenting a directed conversion scenario. At the same time, the manuals 
that were worked out in the project cooperation contribute to laying the founda-
tion for a future transformation on their own. 
Second, a theory-based approach to the problem of knowledge transfer in 
the field of intercultural translation” is required for bridging the gap between 
two different spheres of historically rooted political and societal cultures. Thus 
                                                             
3  Within the transfer project “Intergenerational understanding after the fall of the Wall” in 
2015, 16 East German families were interviewed about how their grandparents and parents 
are passing on information about the GDR times to their children’s and grandchildren’s gen-
eration (a publication of the comprehensive interview transcripts is being prepared). 
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potential misunderstandings and wrong conclusions can be avoided more effec-
tively. Third, normally there are legacies of the old system, living on after 
system change. Such legacies are deeply rooted and they encapsulate core 
elements of a national political and social culture, in both parts of Germany, for 
example, in the customization on welfare state (Gabriel, Holtmann, et al. 2015). 
After system change, this factor should be regarded thoroughly because it is 
these legacies which reflect path dependencies in political and social culture 
successfully overcoming the ruptures of system transition. Afterwards they 
help to preserve traditional social habits and moral norms as well as identifying 
‘hidden’ endogenous talents such as local entrepreneurship (cf. the article of 
Fritsch and Wyrwich 2016, in this HSR Forum) both of which can help to face 
the emerging challenges of system change.  
Fourth, strategic responses being adequate to arousing challenges of social, 
political and economic transition cannot disregard the field (importance) of 
institutions. The case of Germany demonstrates that it requires a long-term 
strategy or at least incremental steps of controlled institutional change in order 
to manage the enormous uncertainties. Fifth, as well as institutions, actors do 
matter. This refers to the key role devoted to political, economic and societal 
elites in times of system change (cf. the articles of Best and Vogel 2016, and 
Martens 2016, in this HSR Forum). Therefore, it is necessary to set free decen-
tralized resources of political and economic modernization in the form of local 
autonomy, individual free entrepreneurship, or personal self-efficacy (all com-
bined would be optimal) (cf. the articles of Holtmann and Rademacher 2016; 
Fritsch and Wyrwich 2016; and Silbereisen 2016, in this HSR Forum). And 
sixth, being confronted with unexpected risks of lifestyle changes, such as 
unemployment, career breaks and the devaluation of personal developmental 
assets, people affected by such misfortune tend to drop from high expectations 
into deep disappointment. In such cases, the new political order is usually de-
clared responsible for causing these grievances. Therefore, stimulating decen-
tralized resources of self-help is also important for ensuring the popular legiti-
macy of the new system in times of risk ‘between the systems.’ 
In the following articles in this HSR Forum we shall outline these dimen-
sions of change by describing selected empirical facets of the German unifica-
tion from a more general perspective. Beforehand, and as part of this introduc-
tion, the research area for the purposes of intercultural translation will be 
modeled theoretically. 
2.  The Mechanisms of Transcoding  
The real challenges for policy transfer researchers are the complex issues in-
volved in the transformation and integration of different systems. It is obvious 
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that policies that emerged and were formulated in specific societies at specific 
moments of time are bound to these conditions and cannot be transferred as 
such into other societies and their specific circumstances. Therefore, transfer of 
knowledge can only be successful when the specificities of the respective cul-
tural, social, historical etc. conditions are fully taken into account. This means 
that transfer of knowledge should be considered as an act of neo-
contextualization of knowledge. 
For this purpose we have proceeded by taking three steps, as illustrated in 
figure 1. We call [labeled] this whole process “transcoding,” and it includes 
two methodological tools of cultural “translation” and “code switching.” 
Figure 1:  Mechanism of Transcoding 
 
3.  Translation and Transcoding as Methodological Tools 
for Intercultural Policy Transfer  
The term “translation,” as it is used in our project, does not relate to the transla-
tion of words, but it is rather used in Walter Benjamin’s sense of “cultural 
translation” (1923). Cultural translation can be defined as an active process of 
interpreting and transforming other cultures within a specific historical context; 
it is neither an equivalent exchange of meanings between different cultural 
texts, nor a mediation of meanings from a transcendental position. Benjamin’s 
theorization of translation is productive in that it frees translation from having 
to be a parasite on the original, and instead allows it an autonomous position. 
This is because what the translator aspires to translate is not the original text 
but what he calls “pure language” an unrepresentable “idea” that is “potentiali-
ty,” inherent in, but not reducible to, the original.  
Benjamin’s views were actively adopted in the field of cultural studies from 
the moment cultural translation started to become a theoretical issue. In the 
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theory of cultural translation, translation is defined as a particular case of inter-
cultural communication with the purpose of bridging the gap between different 
cultures. The starting point of cultural translation theory is the hypothesis that 
cultural differences of tradition, value, thought, etc. make intercultural commu-
nication impossible (Bassnett and Refevere 1990).  
Hence, the translator Benjamin refers to a very peculiar role within cultural 
translation. This is because, in cultural translation, the context in which the 
translation takes place, and the translator, depending on who it is, can either 
bring about an equal relationship between two cultures, or create a hierarchical 
relationship between them. In this sense, Lydia Liu emphasizes that  
the crucial thing here is not whether translation between cultures is possible 
(people do it anyway), or whether the ‘other’ is knowable, or even whether an 
abstruse ‘text’ is decipherable, but what practical purpose or needs […] bring 
an ethnographer to pursue cultural translation (Liu 1995, 2).  
A policy transfer should therefore be understood as an act of “cultural transla-
tion.” In any policy transfer, the translator must always have a specific goal in 
mind. Through the act of translating, a new translation is created; this transla-
tion must exist within its own context and the original policy must be modified 
in order to adapt it to the new context and configuration of policies. Of course, 
just like the term “transfer,” the term “translation” also exists as a metaphor, 
leading to certain problems when describing cultural and social practices. Nev-
ertheless, we can agree with Freeman that the concept of “translation” has the 
advantage of being able to explain the act of policy translation better than the 
concept of “transfer” (Freeman 2008). 
The term “translation” makes uncertainties of any “sign” as an instrument of 
communication evident. It is in reference to this that Freeman contends:  
We communicate by means of signs (words and pictures, sounds and images), 
that is, by choosing or making representations of what we mean. But the rela-
tionship between the sign and what it signifies is neither determined nor me-
chanical: what things mean or represent is a matter of convention (a social 
construct) and it is invariably inexact. Understanding may come to be shared, 
but it cannot be identical. This fundamental epistemological uncertainty, this 
requirement that every utterance be accompanied by some hermeneutic move 
on the part of the reader or listener, is a source of innovation and creativity as 
well as error and failure. Translation makes this uncertainty explicit (Freeman 
2009, 440).  
It is in this sense that structural linguists like Saussure understand translation to 
be “a sign which stands for a sign, a representation of a representation or a 
representation” (Freeman 2008, 5). In actual fact, the concept of translation not 
only means “the replacing of terms in one language with those in another,” but 
above all “a substitution of one set of relationships or associations with anoth-
er.” Translation is a performative “articulation,” and the concept is used as such 
by Stuart Hall and Ernesto Laclau. It is “the work of bringing two (or more) 
 HSR 41 (2016) 3  │  204 
things into relation with one another. For such relationships are not essential or 
given: they have to be made and maintained, or ‘performed’” (Law 1999). Such 
relationships can be agonistic and differential but also antagonistic. In this 
sense the notion of translation is a “dual movement of (re)presentation and 
(re)association,” which “draws attention to the change, adaptation, mutation 
and transformation which takes place in all instances of communication or 
transfer” (Freeman 2008, 12).  
Naturally, the decisive role in policy transfer as cultural translation is played by 
the translator. We have been able to observe several historical cases of intercultur-
al policy transfer. This has been possible because the respective translators had 
linked the policy decision process that lead to the creation of the original language 
text with the policy decision process under which the target language text was then 
created. However, the act of translation for policy transfers and other cultural 
translations are clearly different, since the act of translation for policy transfers can 
be understood as a process of transcoding, rather than translation. 
“Transcoding” is not an established term within cultural studies and the so-
cial sciences. However, it is an established concept in the field of communication 
technics where it refers to the act of converting something to a different format of 
similar or like quality in order to gain compatibility with another program or 
application, such as transferring a video from a camcorder to a hard drive.  
Using the method of “transcoding” has (several) advantages since the re-
contextualization can be made in both social and cultural processes. The term 
transcoding points to the change of “codes,” i.e. sets of rules of signification 
which are part of every transposition of knowledge contents from one context 
to another, thereby calling attention to these contexts.  
4.  Seven Domains of Transformation as Selected Fields 
for the Transfer of Knowledge  
On the basis of this theoretical framework, knowledge transfer has been fo-
cused on selected contents (policies) on the sub-systemic level. The connecting 
factors are seven “signatures” of the German reunification: elite change (cf. 
Best and Vogel 2016, in this HSR Forum), private entrepreneurship (cf. Fritsch 
and Wyrwich 2016), labor market (cf. Ketzmerick 2016), management of fac-
tories of small and medium, range (cf. Martens 2016), decentralization (cf. 
Holtmann and Rademacher 2016), generational experiences engraved in life 
stories (cf. Hofmann and Martens 2016), and psychosocial coping with system 
change (cf. Silbereisen 2016). For these domains of transfer we compiled prac-
tical manuals in cooperation with our South Korean cooperation partners so as 
to prepare for incremental processes of systemic change on a small scale. The 
knowledge transfer followed a multi-stage relay principle. The researchers of 
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SFB 580 functioned as transferees and passed on their knowledge to the Kore-
an cooperation partners. The cooperation partners then processed this 
knowledge in the role of translators in such a way that South Korean actors 
who will be concerned with cross-border or cross-systemic collaboration in the 
future are able to reduce uncertainties of doing well when dealing with North 
Korean individuals or problem situations. 
The assignment of the German transferees to the different domains of transfer 
naturally followed the disciplinary issues and the boundaries of the researchers 
involved and their respective scientific specializations: Labor market research, 
economics, political sciences, psychology and sociology. The inclusion of the 
Korean translators and their work followed the same principle. Yet, a fundamen-
tal result of the interdisciplinary designed SFB 580 was that the comprehensive 
and abrupt social change that accompanied the German reunification developed a 
complex and holistic dynamic that could neither be comprehended by individual 
disciplines nor handled by means of stand-alone political interventions. Once the 
“political floodgates” have been breached, there is little benefit in turning the 
individual “social adjusting screws.” Rather, particularly far-reaching coordinated 
decisions of general principle have to be made in a very short time although with 
a long-term vision in mind. This procedure also bears great risks for faulty deci-
sions. However, in our opinion there are hardly any alternatives to this procedure, 
because the swiftness of transformational processes does not allow ample time 
for planned, structured reactions or incremental procedures. 
With this in mind we also view the future Korean reunification and the 
transformation of North Korea that is necessary for reunification as holistic 
processes. This is also the reason why the manuals of individual domains are 
intertwined, even though they appear as statements that stand on their own. For 
example, the integration of former North Korean functional elites is viewed as 
a key precondition for a successful and non-violent “inner unity.” Decentral-
ized structures can be a sociopolitical advantage in unification-transformations 
because loyalty of these elites is more strongly tied to their local and regional 
affiliation than to their role in the demised authoritarian regime. Furthermore, 
international comparison of systems assigns democracy-promoting and effi-
ciency-increasing effects to decentralized structures. The latter aspect is related 
to the everyday experience that individuals who are familiar with certain socie-
tal problems are better at solving them. However, this argument presumes that 
the democratically elected elites have regional ties in order to fulfill these con-
ditions. In this way elite integration and political and administrative decentrali-
zation are mutually interdependent. 
This interdependency can easily be expanded onto the other domains as 
well. A political and economic opening of North Korea will inevitably lead to 
economic distortions, risks, and dramatic changes in the labor market. To alle-
viate growing social inequality, an expansion of social transfer systems within 
 HSR 41 (2016) 3  │  206 
South Korea and the expansion of this system to North Korea during the unifi-
cation process will be unavoidable. Prima facie, the less transfer payments are 
required the higher the employment rate turns out or respectively the more 
labor force can be integrated into the labor market. During the economic trans-
formation from a quasi-military organized plan and command economy to an 
open market economy, two aspects are especially important: enterprise privati-
zation and business creation. However, the population will only be able to find 
employment in companies that are able to survive during the times of dramatic 
change, even if North Korea is unified with South Korea. Although the German 
experience shows that privatization can happen through external acquisitions, 
companies which are successful in the long run rely on regional business elites, 
at least in middle management. 
Business creation on the other hand, is an almost entirely regional and de-
centralized process. Moreover, regions with a higher level of business creation 
in the period of transition can cope better at a later point in time with the con-
sequences of economic transformation. It is proven that a “regional culture of 
entrepreneurial independence” persisted in Germany. Regions that showed a 
high level of entrepreneurial independence in the mid-1920s had more business 
creations after 1989/1990. The proverbial “merchants of Kaesong” might be-
come similar “pioneers” of market economy, so that the “hidden mercantilism” 
of North Korea’s kitchen gardens and private markets evolves into similar 
regional entrepreneurial traditions. 
However, not only do regional differences determine these political, social 
and economic processes, but also autobiographical experiences and social ties 
which differ between generations. The radical social change during the transi-
tional phase devaluates prior experiences and shatters social capital, yet it does 
not destroy the self-efficacy that is acquired throughout a lifetime. Self-efficacy 
alleviates the consequences of current hardships in future life. The more self-
efficacy is supported – particularly for adolescents through schools and educa-
tion – the higher the chance for the people to assert themselves later on (resili-
ence), and the lesser the social costs of transformation. From the perspective of 
developmental psychology, unification planning should consider how useful 
self-efficacy experiences can be provided for young people. Personal success in 
education, occupation, and entrepreneurial independence will become invalua-
ble psychological, economic and socio-political resources for a successful 
reunification. 
5.  Gaming Simulation as a Kind of Evaluation 
In order to evaluate the results of the aforementioned three-step process of 
problematization, translation and transcoding experiences of the German reuni-
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fication in a realistic setting, a simulation game on challenges of a contingent 
Korean reunification was conducted with South Korean public servants. The 
simulation game was an additional element of the program of the Academy of 
Unification of the Institute of Korean Studies at the Freie Universität Berlin in 
2015. Although this HSR Forum does not dedicate a chapter to the simulation 
game we shall outline its “philosophy” in short terms here, so appreciating its 
utilization value for simulating scenarios of unification.   
A strong evaluation of the guidelines, which are based on our findings, 
could be proven regarding to their usefulness of direct, corresponding or muta-
tis mutandis application in a real unification process. This creates three issues: 
Firstly, a reunification on the Korean peninsula is not accomplished yet – and 
some would argue that it can never happen. Secondly, if unification does happen, 
it is apparent that it will not happen as rapidly as was the case in Germany (Lee 
2001, 322). Thirdly, we are not willing or able to make statements on the Korean 
reunification with the aim of evaluating our own results and findings. Therefore, 
we are compelled to simulate a kind of incremental unification process. 
Furthermore, political changes are fundamentally driven by political consid-
erations and decisions. Following along the lines of the “Actor-centered Institu-
tionalism” by Scharpf (1997), our evaluation also had to take the political elites 
into consideration as well as they would probably bear the responsibility for a 
future Korean reunification. This leads to two other problems: On the one hand, 
our capabilities to acquire high-ranking political deciders that have been in 
office recently for being a part of a gaming simulation are very limited in both 
Koreas. On the other hand, no one knows at this time who will possibly be in 
charge of implementing the contingent reunification process there. Therefore 
we decided to ask participants of the last Academy program to evaluate our 
guidelines. Public servants of several boards of the South Korean public service 
were selected and sent by the Ministry of Unification (Tong-il-bu) in order to 
be taught about the German unification process at the Academy of Unification 
in Berlin. This probably makes them the most likely future experts on reunifi-
cation issues in South Korea. Nevertheless, in our simulation they would simp-
ly play the roles of such experts. 
We decided to conduct a simulation game, because “prototype gaming simula-
tion combines role-play and simulation” by representing “dynamic models of 
[possible] real situations” (Kriz 2003, 496). Gaming simulation usually consists 
of three phases: (1) the briefing, (2) the game, and (3) the debriefing (ibid., 497). 
1) During the “briefing,” a goal was first defined: The president of the Repub-
lic of South Korea orders an expert’s concept for the administrative structure 
of a unified Korea. Furthermore, our guideline materials, which are summa-
rized in the following chapters, were briefly presented. The roles of the 
Academy participants were determined according to their recent positions 
and the different policies; they were responsible for economy, jurisdiction, 
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national or public security, etc. In this way, we were able to perform a five-
day simulation game in an “open (free form)” mode, rather than a “closed 
(rigid rule)” mode (ibid.). 
2) The game participants were separated into two different workgroups. During 
the simulation their work was interrupted by several critical interventions, 
which took the form of real newspaper articles about the German reunification 
and “faked” but nevertheless lifelike articles about the impacts of a Korean 
unification. The aim of those interventions was to implement a more realistic 
experience of uncertainty into the simulation, since such interventions would 
be most likely to occur during political transition processes as well. 
3) Additionally, we employed two different modes of debriefing: Firstly, daily 
reflections of the participant’s experiences, thus allowing them “to apply the 
knowledge acquired during the simulation to the real world” (ibid.). Second-
ly, on the last day a “meta-debriefing” (a debriefing of the debriefing) was 
conducted in order to reflect on the facilitation and debriefing of the game, 
the design process and the model of the game” (ibid.). 
Although a detailed analysis of the gaming simulation is still outstanding, three 
kinds of initial impressions have emerged throughout: Firstly, the rather inexperi-
enced Academy of Unification’s participants were able to develop a ten-point 
plan for the complex transformation process of a Korean reunification. This plan 
however, coincided significantly with the ten-point program that Federal Chan-
cellor Helmut Kohl presented in the German Bundestag on 21st November 1989 
in order to overcome the separation of Germany and Europe. Secondly, the im-
pression is emerging that South Korean public servants that did not take part in a 
comparable educational program are able to successfully handle the guidelines 
that emerged on the basis of the research that is presented in the following chap-
ters. Finally, the gaming simulation proves that intercultural knowledge transfer 
on a future Korean reunification cannot be carried out by taking over the German 
experiences; rather it is necessary to employ smart-copying strategies.  
Since such smart-copying strategies have been discussed in the context of 
the technical advances of South Korea or Japan for a long time (e.g. Amsden 
1989, 20; Cox 2008), this is a significant conventional result for further en-
hancing the Academy of Unification’s educational program. In addition, smart-
copying may also be useful for coping with the complex processes that will 
accompany a national reunification on the Korean peninsula. 
6.  Final Remark 
Summarizing our won knowledge about the transfer of knowledge concerning 
the topic of unification we can make a final remark. Though German experi-
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ences with unification since 1990 cannot be transferred to contemporary Korea 
simply like a blueprint, one can get some helpful “lessons” of the case of Ger-
many: In general, the biographical-formative experiences of the older genera-
tion do not break abruptly at the momentum of unification and system change; 
they are continuing on both sides of the fallen border, and they serve as a per-
sonal guide to coping with the challenges of new times. In times of transition, 
different and conflictive expectations are emerging: There are fears (and de-
mands) of loss and punishment as well as hopes of more welfare and freedom 
(and growing resistance against reallocation of public goods), a moral desire for 
justice arouses as well as an opportunistic pragmatism of ‘muddling through.’ All 
these expectations and mental reservations are belonging to the “legacies” of the 
two halves of a formerly divided country. A conciliative policy of unification 
should bear these legacies in mind for to promote a controlled institutional 
change towards market economy and democracy, in a way that helps elites and 
the man in the street to respond to tremendous risks and uncertainties. 
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